Targeted Mismatch Adversarial Attack: Query with a Flower to Retrieve
  the Tower by Tolias, Giorgos et al.
Targeted Mismatch Adversarial Attack:
Query with a Flower to Retrieve the Tower
Giorgos Tolias Filip Radenovic Ondrˇej Chum
Visual Recognition Group, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Czech Technical University in Prague
Abstract
Access to online visual search engines implies sharing of
private user content – the query images. We introduce the
concept of targeted mismatch attack for deep learning based
retrieval systems to generate an adversarial image to con-
ceal the query image. The generated image looks nothing
like the user intended query, but leads to identical or very
similar retrieval results. Transferring attacks to fully un-
seen networks is challenging. We show successful attacks to
partially unknown systems, by designing various loss func-
tions for the adversarial image construction. These include
loss functions, for example, for unknown global pooling op-
eration or unknown input resolution by the retrieval system.
We evaluate the attacks on standard retrieval benchmarks
and compare the results retrieved with the original and ad-
versarial image.
1. Introduction
Information about users is a valuable article. Websites,
service providers, and even operating systems collect and
store user data. The collected data have various forms,
e.g. visited websites, interactions between users in social
networks, hardware fingerprints, keyboard typing or mouse
movement patterns, etc. Internet search engines record what
the users search for, as well as the responses, i.e. clicks, to
the returned results.
Recent development in computer vision allowed efficient
and precise large scale image search engines to be launched,
such as Google Image Search. Nevertheless, similarly to
text search engines, queries – the images – are stored and
further analyzed by the provider1. In this work, we protect
the user image (target) by constructing a novel image. The
constructed image is visually dissimilar to the target, how-
ever, when used as a query, identical results are retrieved as
with the target image. Large-scale search methods require
short-code image representation, both for storage minimiza-
tion and for search efficiency, which are usually extracted
1Google Search Help: “The pictures you upload in your search may be stored by
Google for 7 days. They won’t be a part of your search history, and we’ll only use
them during that time to make our products and services better.”
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Figure 1. Top two rows show retrieval results to the user query
image (target). Bottom two rows show the results of our attack
where a carrier image (flower, Notre Dame) is perturbed to have
identical descriptor to that of the target in the first row. Identical
results are obtained without disclosing the target.
with Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). We formulate
the problem as an adversarial attack on CNNs.
Adversarial attacks, as introduced by Szegedy et al. [35],
study imperceptible non-random image perturbations to
mislead a neural network. The first attacks were intro-
duced and tested on image classification. In that context,
adversarial attacks are divided into two categories, namely
non-targeted and targeted. The goal of non-targeted attacks
is to change the prediction of a test image to an arbitrary
class [25, 24], while targeted attacks attempt to make a spe-
cific change of the network prediction, i.e. to misclassify the
test image to a predefined target class [35, 7, 10].
Similarly to image classification, adversarial attacks
have been proposed in the domain of image retrieval too.
An non-targeted attack attempts to generate an image that
for a human observer carries the same visual information,
while for the neural network it appears dissimilar to other
images of the same object [19, 20, 37]. This way, a user
protects personal images and does not allow them to be in-
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dexed for content-based search, even when the images are
publicly available. In this paper, we address targeted attacks
aiming to retrieve images that are related to a hidden target
query without explicitly revealing the image (see Figure 1).
Example applications include users checking whether their
copyrighted image, or personal photo with sensitive con-
tent, etc. is indexed, i.e. used by anyone else, without pro-
viding the query image itself. Such case of privacy protec-
tion is an example of “legal” motivation. A concept that
bears resemblance to ours exists in the speech recognition,
but in a malicious context. Carlini et al. [6] generate hidden
voice commands that are imperceivable to human listeners
but are interpreted as commands by devices. We investi-
gate adversarial attacks beyond the white-box scenario, in
which all the parameters and design choices of the retrieval
system are known. Specifically, we analyze the cases of un-
known indexing image resolution and unknown global pool-
ing used in the network.
2. Related work
Adversarial attacks on image classification were intro-
duced by Szegedy et al. [35]. Follow up approaches are
categorized to white-box attacks [35, 12] if there is com-
plete knowledge of the model or to black-box [28, 29] oth-
erwise. Adversarial images are generated by various meth-
ods in the literature, such as optimization-based approaches
using box-constrained L-BFGS optimizer [35], gradient de-
scent with change of variable [7]. A fast gradient sign
method [12] and variants [18, 10] are designed to be fast
rather than optimal, while DeepFool [25] analytically de-
rives an optimal solution method by assuming that neural
networks are totally linear. All these approaches solve an
optimization problem given a test image and its associated
class in the case of non-targeted attacks or a test image and
a target class in the case of targeted attacks. A universal
non-targeted approach is proposed by Moosavi et al. [24],
where an image-agnostic Universal Adversarial Perturba-
tion (UAP) is computed and applied to unseen images to
cause network misclassification.
Adversarial attacks on image retrieval are studied by re-
cent work [19, 20, 37] in a non-targeted scenario for CNN-
based approaches. Liu et al. [20] and Zheng et al. [37] adopt
the optimization-based approach [35], while Li et al. [19]
adopt the UAP [24]. Similar attacks on classical retrieval
systems that are based on SIFT local descriptors [21] have
been addressed in an earlier line of work by Do et al. [9, 8].
To the best of our knowledge, no existing work focuses on
targeted adversarial attacks for image retrieval. Targeted at-
tacks for nearest neighbors in high dimensional spaces are
studied by Amsaleg et al. [2], where they directly perturb
the high dimensional vectors and show that the high local
intrinsic dimensionality results in high vulnerability.
3. Background
We provide the background for non-targeted and targeted
adversarial attacks in the domain of image classification,
then detail the basic components of CNN-based image re-
trieval approaches, and finally discuss non-targeted attacks
for image retrieval. All variants presented in this section
assume white-box access to the network classifier for clas-
sification or the feature extractor network for retrieval.
3.1. Image classification attacks
We denote the initial RGB image, called the carrier im-
age, by tensor xc ∈ [0, 1]W×H×3, and its associated label
by yc ∈ {1 . . .K}. A CNN trained for K-way classifica-
tion, denoted by function f : RW×H×3 → RK , produces
vector f(xc) comprising class confidence values. Adversar-
ial attack methods for classification typically study the case
of images with correct class prediction, i.e. arg maxi f(xc)i
is equal to yc, where f(xc)i is the i-th dimension of vec-
tor f(xc). An adversary aims at generating adversarial
image xa that is visually similar to the carrier image but
is classified incorrectly by f . The goal of the attack can
vary [1] and corresponds to different loss functions opti-
mizing x ∈ [0, 1]W×H×3.
Non-targeted misclassification is achieved by reducing
the confidence for class yc, while increasing for all other
classes. It is achieved by minimizing loss function
Lnc(xc, yc;x) = −`ce(f(x), yc) + λ ||x− xc||2. (1)
Function `ce(f(x), yc) is the cross-entropy loss which is
maximized to achieve misclassification. In this way, mis-
classification is performed to any wrong class. Term ||x −
xc||2 is called carrier distortion or simply distortion and is
the squared l2 norm of the perturbation vector r = x− xc.
Other norms, such as l∞, are also applicable [7].
Targeted misclassification has the goal of generating an
adversarial image that gets classified into target class yt. It
is achieved by minimizing loss function
Ltc(xc, yt;x) = `ce(f(x), yt) + λ ||x− xc||2. (2)
In contrast to (1), cross-entropy loss is minimized w.r.t. the
target class instead of maximized w.r.t. the carrier class.
Optimization of (1) or (2) generates the adversarial images
given by
xa = arg min
x
Lnc(xc, yc;x), (3)
or
xa = arg min
x
Ltc(xc, yt;x), (4)
respectively. In the literature [35, 7], various optimizers
such as Adam [16], or L-BFGS [5] are used. The box con-
straints, i.e. x ∈ [0, 1]W×H×3, are ensured by projected
gradient descent, clipped gradient descent, change of vari-
ables [7], or optimization algorithms that support box con-
straints such as L-BFGS. It is a common practice to per-
form line search for weight λ > 0 and keep the attack of
minimum distortion. The optimization is initialized by the
carrier image.
3.2. Image retrieval components
This work focuses on attacks on CNN-based image re-
trieval with global image descriptors. An image is mapped
to a high dimensional descriptor by a CNN with a global
pooling layer. The descriptor is consequently normalized to
have unit l2 norm. Then, retrieval from a large dataset w.r.t.
a query image reduces to nearest neighbor search via inner
product evaluation between the query descriptor and dataset
descriptors. The model for descriptor extraction consists of
the following components or parameters.
Image resolution: The input image x is re-sampled to im-
age xs to have the largest dimension equal to s.
Feature extraction: Image xs is fed as an input to a Fully
Convolutional Network (FCN), denoted by function g :
RW×H×3 → Rw×h×d, which maps xs to tensor g(xs).
When the image is fed at its original resolution we denote
it by g(x).
Pooling: A global pooling operation h : Rw×h×d → Rd
maps the input tensor g(xs) to descriptor (h ◦ g)(xs).
We assume that l2 normalization is included in this pro-
cess, so that the output descriptor has unit l2 norm. We
consider various options for pooling, namely, max pool-
ing (MAC) [32, 36], sum pooling (SPoC) [4], general-
ized mean pooling (GeM) [31], regional max pooling (R-
MAC) [36], and spatially and channel-wise weighted sum
pooling (CroW) [15]. The framework can be extended to
multiple other variants [27, 23, 3].
Whitening: Descriptor post-processing is performed by
function w : Rd → Rd, which includes centering, whiten-
ing and l2 re-normalization [31]. Finally, input image xs is
mapped to descriptor (w ◦ h ◦ g)(xs).
For brevity we denote gx = g(x), hx = (h ◦ g)(x), and
wx = (w ◦ h ◦ g)(x). In the following, we consider an
extraction model during the adversarial image optimization
and another one during the testing of the retrieval/matching
performance. In order to differentiate between the two cases
we refer to the components of the former as attack-model,
attack-resolution, attack-FCN, attack-pooling and attack-
whitening and the latter as test-model, test-resolution, test-
FCN, test-pooling and test-whitening.
3.3. Image retrieval attacks
Adversarial attacks for image retrieval are so far limited
to the non-targeted case.
Carrier
Target
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Figure 2. In targeted mismatch attacks an adversarial image is gen-
erated given a carrier and a target image. The adversarial image
should match the descriptor of the target image but be visually dis-
similar to the target; visual dissimilarity to the target is achieved
via visual similarity to the carrier. The attack is formed by a re-
trieval query using the adversarial image, where the goal is to ob-
tain identical results as with the target query while keeping the
target image private.
Non-targeted mismatch aims at generating an adversarial
image with small perturbation compared to the carrier im-
age and descriptor that is dissimilar to that of the carrier.
This is formulated by loss function
Lnr(xc;x) = `nr(x,xc) +λ ||x− xc||2
= h>x hxc +λ ||x− xc||2. (5)
The adversarial image is given by minimizer
xa = arg min
x
Lnr(xc;x). (6)
In this way, the adversary modifies images into their non-
indexable counterpart. The exact formulation in (5) has not
been addressed; the closest is the work of Li et al. [19]
where they are seeking of a UAP by maximizing l1 descrip-
tor distance instead of minimizing cosine similarity.
4. Method
We formulate the problem of targeted mismatch attack
and then propose various loss functions to address it and to
construct concealed query images.
4.1. Problem formulation
The adversary tries to generate an adversarial image with
the goal of using it as a (concealed) query for image retrieval
instead of a target image. The goal is to obtain the same
retrieval results without disclosing any information about
the target image itself.
We assume a target image xt ∈ RW×H×3 and a carrier
image xc with the same resolution (see Figure 2). The goal
of the adversary is to generate an adversarial image xa that
has high descriptor similarity but very low visual similarity
to the target. Visual (human) dissimilarity is not straight-
forward to model; we model visual similarity w.r.t. another
image, i.e. the carrier, instead. We refer to this problem as
targeted mismatch attack and the corresponding loss func-
tion is given by
Ltr(xc,xt;x) = `tr(x,xt) + λ ||x− xc||2. (7)
In Section 4.2 we propose different instantiations of the
performance loss `tr according to the known and unknown
components of the test-model.
4.2. Targeted mismatch attacks
In all the following, we assume a white-box access to
the FCN, while the whitening is assumed unknown and is
totally ignored during the optimization of the adversarial
image; its impact on the attack is evaluated by adding it to
the test-model. In general, if all the parameters of the test-
model are known, the task is to generate an adversarial im-
age that reproduces the descriptor of the target image. Then,
nearest neighbor search will retrieve identical results as if
querying with the target image. Choosing a different per-
formance loss introduces invariance or robustness to some
parameters of the attacked retrieval system, when these pa-
rameters are unknown. We list different performance loss
functions used to minimize (7).
Global descriptor. Loss function
`desc(x,xt) = 1− h>x hxt . (8)
is suitable when all parameters of the retrieval system are
known, including the pooling, and when the image is pro-
cessed by the neural network at its original resolution. Pool-
ing function h is MAC, SPoC, or GeM in our experiments.
Activation tensor. In this scenario, the output of the FCN
should be the same for the adversarial and target image, at
the original resolution. This is achieved by minimizing the
mean squared difference of the two activation tensors
`tens(x,xt) =
||gx − gxt ||2
w · h · d . (9)
Identical tensors guarantee identical descriptors computed
on top of these tensors, including those where spatial in-
formation is taken into account. This covers all global or
regional pooling operations, and even deep local features,
e.g. DELF [26]. However, our experiments show that pre-
serving the activation tensor may result in transferring the
target’s visual content on the adversarial image (see Fig-
ure 7). Further, the visual appearance of the target image
can be partially recovered by inverting [22] the activation
tensor of the adversarial image.
Activation histogram. Preserving channel-wise first or-
der statistics of the activation tensor, at the original resolu-
tion, is a weaker constraint than preserving the exact activa-
tion tensor. It guarantees identical descriptors for all global
pooling operations that ignore spatial information. Activa-
tion histogram loss function is defined as
`hist(x,xt) =
1
d
d∑
i=1
||u(gx,b)i − u(gxt ,b)i||, (10)
where u(gx,b)i is the histogram of activations from the i-th
channel of gx and b is the vector of histogram bin centers.
Histograms are created with soft assignment by an RBF ker-
nel2. Compared with the tensor case, the histogram opti-
mization does not preserve the spatial distribution, is signif-
icantly faster, and does not suffer from undesirable disclo-
sure artifacts.
Different image resolution. We require an adversarial im-
age at the original resolution of the target (W ×H), which
when down-sampled to resolution s, it retrieves similar re-
sults as the target image down-sampled to the same resolu-
tion. This is achieved by loss function
Lstr(x,xt;x) = `tr(x
s,xst ) + λ ||x− xc||2, (11)
where `tr can be any of the descriptor, tensor, or histogram
based performance loss functions. Note that (11) is differ-
ent from (7), the performance loss is computed from re-
sampled images, while the distortion loss is still on the orig-
inal images.
A common down-sampling method used in CNNs is bi-
linear interpolation. We have observed that different im-
plementations of such a layer result in different descrip-
tors. The difference is caused by the presence of high-
frequencies in the high-resolution image. The adversarial
perturbation tends to be high-frequency, therefore differ-
ent down-sampling results may significantly alternate the
result of attack. In order to reduce the sensitivity to down-
sampling, we introduce high-frequency removal by Gaus-
sian blurring in the optimization. Instead of (11), the fol-
lowing loss is used
Lsˆtr(x,xt;x) = `tr(x
sˆ,xsˆt ) + λ ||x− xc||2, (12)
where xsˆ is image x blurred with Gaussian kernel with σb
and then down-sampled. Our experiments show, that blur-
ring plays an important role when the attack-resolution s
does not exactly match the test-resolution s′, i.e. s′ = s+∆.
Ensembles. We perform the adversarial optimization for a
combination of the aforementioned loss functions by mini-
mizing their sum. Some examples follow.
2We use e
(x−b)2
2σ2 , where σ = 0.1, x is a scalar activation normalized
by the maximum activation value of the target, and b is the bin center. We
uniformly sample bin centers in [0,1] with step equal to 0.05.
- The test-pooling operation is unknown but there is a set
P of possible pooling operations. Minimization of (7) is
performed for performance loss
`P(x,xt) =
∑
p∈P `p(x,xt)
|P| . (13)
- The test-resolution is unknown. Joint optimization for a set
S of resolutions is performed with
LStr (x,xt;x) =
∑
s∈S `tr(x
s,xst )
|S| + λ ||x− xc||
2. (14)
Any performance loss `tr is used, with or without blurring.
4.3. Optimization
The optimization is performed with Adam and projected
gradient descent is used to apply the box constraints, i.e.
x ∈ [0, 1]W×H×3. The adversarial image is initialized by
the carrier image, while after every update its values are
clipped to be in [0, 1]. The adversarial image is given by
xa = arg min
x
Ltr(xc,xt;x), (15)
where Ltr can be Ldesc (with “desc” equal to MAC, SPoC,
or GeM), LP , Lhist, or Ltens according to the variant, while
the variants with multiple scales are denoted e.g. by LShist
without blur or LSˆhist with blur.
5. Experiments
Given a test architecture, we validate the success of the
targeted mismatch attack in two ways. First, by measuring
the cosine similarity between descriptors of the adversar-
ial image xa and the target xt (should be as high as possi-
ble), and second, by using xa as an image retrieval query
and compare its performance with that of the target query
(should be as close as possible)3.
5.1. Datasets and evaluation protocol
We perform experiments on four standard image re-
trieval benchmarks, namely Holidays [14], Copydays [11],
ROxford [30], and RParis [30]. They all consist of a set
of query images and a set of database images, while the
ground-truth denotes which are the relevant dataset images
per query. We choose to perform attacks only with the first
50 queries for Holidays and Copydays to form adversarial
attack benchmarks of reasonable size, while for ROxford
and RParis we keep all 70 of them and use the Medium
evaluation setup. All queries are used as targets to form an
attack and retrieval performance is measured with mean Av-
erage Precision (mAP). Unless otherwise stated we use the
“flower” of Figure 1 as the carrier; it is cropped to match
the aspect ratio of the target. All images are re-sampled to
3Public implementation: https://github.com/gtolias/tma
have the largest dimension equal to 1024, this is the original
image resolution. ROxford and RParis are treated differ-
ently than the other two due to the cropped image queries;
the cropped image region that defines the query is used
as a target and the relative scale change between queries
and database images should be preserved not to affect the
ground truth. When the image resolution for descriptor ex-
traction is different than the original one, we down-sample
the cropped image with the same scaling factor that the un-
cropped one should have been down-sampled with.
5.2. Implementation details and experimental setup
We set the learning rate equal to 0.01 in all our experi-
ments and perform 100 iterations for Ldesc and Lhist, while
1000 iterations for Ltens. If there is no convergence, we de-
crease the learning rate by a factor of 5 and increase the
number of iterations by a factor 2 and re-start. We nor-
malize the distortion term with the dimensionality of x;
this is skipped in the loss function of Sections 3 and 4 for
brevity. Moreover, in order to handle the different range
of activations for different FCNs, we normalize activation
tensors with the maximum target activation before comput-
ing the mean squared error in (9). Image blurring at res-
olution s in (12) is performed by a Gaussian kernel with
σb = 0.3 max(W,H)/s. The exponent of GeM pooling is
always set to 3.
Setting λ = 0 provides a trivial solution to (7), i.e. xa =
xt. However, we observe that initialization by xc converges
to local minima that are significantly closer to xc than xt
even for the case of λ = 0. In this way, we satisfy the non-
disclosure constraint, i.e. the adversarial image is visually
dissimilar to the target, and do not sacrifice the performance
loss. The image distortion w.r.t. to the carrier image does
not sacrifice the goal of concealing the target and preserving
user privacy. Therefore, in our experiments we mostly focus
on cases with λ = 0, but also validate cases with λ > 0 to
show the impact of the distortion term or in order to promote
the non-disclosure constraint for the case of Ltens.
We experiment with different loss functions for tar-
geted mismatch attacks. We define S0, S1, S2, and
S3 sets of attack-resolutions4. We denote AlexNet [17],
ResNet18 [13], and VGG16 [34] by A , R , and V , re-
spectively. We use networks that are pre-trained on Ima-
geNet [33] and keep only their fully convolutional part. The
AlexNet and ResNet18 ensemble is denoted by E ; mean
loss over two networks is minimized. We report the triplet
attack-model, loss function and value of λ to denote the
kind of adversarial optimization, for example (A,LS1hist ,0).
For testing, we report the triplet test-model, test-pooling and
test-resolution, for example [A,GeM,S0].
4S0 = {1024}, S1 = S0 ∪ {300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900},
S2 = S1 ∪ {350, 450, 550, 650, 750, 850, 950}, S3 = S0 ∪
{262, 289, 319, 351, 387, 427, 470, 518, 571, 630, 694, 765, 843, 929}
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Figure 3. Adversarial images are generated with different loss functions and various measurements are reported as they evolve with the
number of iterations. The presented measurements are: (a) the distortion w.r.t. the carrier image, (b) the performance loss from (7), (c)
descriptor similarity of the adversarial image to the target for test case [A,GeM,S0] and (d) descriptor similarity of the adversarial image
to the carrier for test case [A,GeM,S0]. The target and carrier images are the ones shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 4. Descriptor similarity between the adversarial image and
the target or the carrier as it evolves with the number of itera-
tions. Comparison for test-resolutions that are not in the attack-
resolutions for cases without (solid) and with (dashed) blurring.
The adversarial optimization (left) and the test model (right) are
denoted with→. The target and carrier images are from Figure 7.
5.3. Results
For each adversarial image we perform the following
measurements. We compute its similarity to the target and
to the carrier by cosine similarity of the corresponding de-
scriptors, we measure the carrier distortion and, lastly, we
perform an attack by using it as a query and measure the
average precision which is compared to that of the target.
Optimization iterations. We perform the optimization for
different loss functions and report the measurements over
iteration in Figure 3. Optimizing global descriptor or his-
togram converges much faster than the tensor case and re-
sults in significantly lower distortion. This justifies our
choice of using a lower number of iterations for the two
approaches. Increasing the value of λ keeps the distortion
lower but sacrifices the performance loss, as expected.
h
Ltr Original LGeM LP Lhist Ltens
mAP mAP difference to original
GeM 41.3 −0.0 −0.0 −0.2 −0.1
MAC 37.0 −0.5 −0.0 −0.8 −0.0
SPoC 32.9 −4.4 −0.1 −0.1 −0.7
R-MAC 44.1 −1.2 −0.5 −0.7 −0.0
CroW 38.2 −1.3 −0.4 −0.2 −0.0
x>t xa
GeM 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.998
MAC 1.000 0.972 1.000 0.985 0.996
SPoC 1.000 0.909 1.000 0.999 0.996
R-MAC 1.000 0.972 0.978 0.979 0.997
CroW 1.000 0.968 0.994 0.995 0.998
Table 1. Performance evaluation for attacks based on AlexNet and
various loss functions optimized at the original image resolution
S0. Testing is performed on [A,desc,S0] for multiple types of de-
scriptor/pooling. Mean average Precision on RParis and mean
descriptor similarity between the adversarial image and the tar-
get across all queries is reported. Original corresponds to queries
without attack.
In Figure 4 we show how the similarity to the target and
the carrier evolves for test-resolution that is not included in
the set of attack-resolutions. Processing the images with
image blurring offers significant improvements, especially
for the smaller resolutions.
Robustness to unknown test-pooling. In Table 1 we
present the evaluation comparison for different loss func-
tions and test-pooling. The case of same attack-resolution
and test-resolution is examined first. If the test-pooling is
directly optimized (LGeM or LP case), then perfect perfor-
mance is achieved. The histogram and tensor based ap-
proaches both perform well for a variety of test-descriptors.
Robustness to unknown test-resolution. Cases with dif-
ferent attack-resolution and test-resolution are evaluated
and results are presented in Figure 5. Resolutions that
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Figure 5. Performance evaluation for attack based on AlexNet and a set of attack-resolutions. Mean average Precision onRParis and mean
descriptor similarity between the adversarial image and the target across all queries is shown for increasing test-resolution. Comparison
using different sets of attack-resolutions and comparison for optimization without (S) and with (Sˆ) image blurring.
Target Carrier λ=10 λ=1 λ=0
xt xc xa xa xa
0.702 0.873 0.987 0.998
0.796 0.953 0.995 0.999
Figure 6. Adversarial examples for a carrier image and two dif-
ferent targets while optimizing (A,LSˆ2hist,λ) for various values of λ.
Descriptor similarity is reported for [A,GeM,S0].
are not part of the attack-resolutions suffer from signifi-
cant drop in performance when blurring is not performed,
while blurring improves it. We observe how the retrieval
performance and descriptor similarity between adversarial
image and target are correlated. Moreover, the optimization
for multiple resolutions is clearly better than that for single
resolution, while logarithmic sampling of attack-resolutions
(S3) significantly improves the performance for very small
test-resolution but harms it for larger ones.
Impact of the distortion term. We evaluate [A,GeM,S0]
on queries of RParis for (A,LSˆ2hist,λ) and λ equal to 0, 0.1,
1, 10. The average similarity between the adversarial im-
age and the target is 0.990, 0.987, 0.956, and 0.767, re-
spectively, while the average distortion is 0.0177, 0.0083,
0.0026, and 0.0008, respectively. Examples of adversarial
images are shown in Figure 6.
Impact of the whitening in the test-model. We now
consider the case that the test-model includes descriptor
whitening. The whitening is unknown during the time of
the adversarial optimization. We evaluate the performance
onRParis while learning whitening with PCA onROxford.
Testing without whitening and [A,GeM,S0] or [A,GeM,768]
achieves 41.3, and 40.2 mAP, respectively. After apply-
ing whitening the respective performances increase to 47.5
and 48.0 mAP. Attacks with (A,LSˆ2hist,0) achieve 40.2, and
39.4 mAP when tested in the aforementioned cases without
whitening. Attacks with (A,LSˆ2hist,0) achieve 47.3, and 42.9
mAP when tested in the aforementioned cases with whiten-
ing. Whitening introduces additional challenges, but the at-
tacks seem effective with slightly reduced performance.
Concealing/revealing the target. We generate adversar-
ial images for different loss functions and show examples
in Figure 7. The corresponding tensors show that spatial
information is only preserved in the tensor-based loss func-
tion. The tensor-based approach requires the distortion term
to avoid revealing visual structures of the target (adversarial
images in 6-th and 7-th column). We now pose the ques-
tion “can the FCN activations of the adversarial image re-
veal the content of the target?”. To answer, we invert tensor
gxa at multiple resolutions using the method of Mahendran
and Vedaldi [22]. The tensor-based approach indeed reveals
the target’s content in the reconstruction, while no other ap-
proach does. This highlights the benefits of the proposed
histogram-based optimization. Note that the reconstructed
image resembles the target less if the resolutions used in
the reconstruction are not the same as the attack-resolutions
(rightmost column).
Timings. We report the average optimization time per tar-
get image on Holidays dataset and on a single GPU (Tesla
P100) for some indicative cases. Optimizing (A,LGeM,0),
(A,LSˆ1GeM,0), (A,L
Sˆ1
hist,0), (A,L
Sˆ2
hist,0), and (A,L
Sˆ1
tens,0) takes
1.9, 7.5, 12.3, 22.9, and 68.4 seconds, respectively. Using
ResNet18 (R ,LGeM,0) and (R ,LSˆ2hist,0) take 3.9 and 40.6 sec-
onds, respectively.
Multiple attacks. We show results of multiple attacks in
Table 2. We present the original retrieval performance to-
gether with the difference in the performance caused by the
attack. It summarizes the robustness of the histogram and
tensor based optimization to unknown pooling operations.
It emphasizes the challenges of unknown test-resolution and
the impact of the blurring; this outcome can be useful in
various different attack models. The very last row suggests
that transferring attacks to different FCNs (optimizing on
E , which includes A and R , and testing on V ) is hard to
achieve; it is harder than for classification [35].
Target Carrier (A,LSˆ1GeM,0) (A,L
Sˆ1
hist,0) (A,L
Sˆ1
hist,1) (A,L
Sˆ1
tens,0) (A,L
Sˆ1
tens,1) (A,L
Sˆ2
tens,0) (A,L
Sˆ1
tens,1)
xt xc xa xa xa xa xa xa xa
0.782 1.000 1.000 0.994 0.999 0.997 0.998 0.997
S1 S1 S1 S1 S1 S1 S1 S2 S2 \ S1
Figure 7. Target, carrier and adversarial images for different variants (top image row), a summary of tensor gx by depth-wise maximum
(middle image row) and the inversion of gxt , gxc , or gxa , respectively, over multiple resolutions (bottom image row). The resolutions
for inversion are reported below the bottom row. The tensor inversion shows whether the target, or any information about it, can be
reconstructed from the adversarial image. The first two inversions are presented as a reference. Descriptor similarity to the target is
reported below the first image row for [A,GeM,1024].
Attack Test ROxford RParis Holidays Copydays
(A,LSˆ2hist,0) [A,GeM,S0] 26.9 / +0.2 41.3 / -1.2 81.5 / +0.2 80.4 / -0.4
(R ,LSˆ2GeM,0)
[R ,GeM,S0] 21.5 / -0.7 46.9 / -0.4 82.9 / -0.3 69.3 / -0.7
[R ,GeM,768] 24.0 / -2.5 48.0 / -3.9 81.7 / -4.4 75.6 / -2.8
[R ,GeM,512] 22.4 / -6.7 49.7 /-11.1 82.8 / -0.6 82.1 /-10.7
(R ,LS2hist ,0)
[R ,GeM,S0] 21.5 / -1.2 46.9 / -1.9 82.9 / -0.6 69.3 / -1.3
[R ,GeM,768] 24.0 / -3.7 48.0 / -7.2 81.7 / -2.3 75.6 / -7.1
[R ,GeM,512] 22.4 /-11.2 49.7 /-20.7 82.8 /-17.1 82.1 /-20.6
(R ,LSˆ2hist,0)
[R ,GeM,S0] 21.5 / -1.4 46.9 / -1.8 82.9 / -2.4 69.3 / -1.3
[R ,GeM,768] 24.0 / -5.3 48.0 / -6.0 81.7 / -1.7 75.6 / -4.2
[R ,GeM,512] 22.4 / -7.4 49.7 /-11.9 82.8 / -4.9 82.1 /-11.3
(R ,LSˆ2P ,0)
[R ,CroW,S0]
22.0 / -1.1 45.0 / -0.5 81.0 / +0.9 67.0 / -1.6
(R ,LSˆ2hist,0) 22.0 / -0.3 45.0 / -0.8 81.0 / +1.3 67.0 / -1.0
(R ,LSˆ2tens,0) 22.0 / -0.7 45.0 / -0.0 81.0 / -0.6 67.0 / -3.0
(E,LSˆ2hist,0)
[A,GeM,S0] 26.9 / -2.3 41.3 / -5.5 81.5 / -3.1 80.4 / -4.9
[R ,CroW,S0] 22.0 / -1.1 45.0 / -0.8 81.0 / +1.0 67.0 / -0.8
[V ,GeM,S0] 38.1 /-34.9 54.0 /-47.4 85.7 /-72.6 80.0 /-72.9
Table 2. Performance evaluation for multiple attacks, test-models,
and datasets. Mean average Precision over the original queries,
together with the mAP difference to the original caused by the
attack, is reported. The parameters of the adversarial optimization
during the attack are shown in the leftmost column, while the type
of test-model used is shown in the second column.
6. Conclusions
We have introduced the problem of targeted mismatch
attack for image retrieval and address it in order to con-
struct concealed query images instead of the initial intended
query. We show that optimizing the first order statistics is
a good way to generate images that result in the desired
descriptors without disclosing the content of the intended
query. We analyze the impact of image re-sampling, which
is a natural component of image retrieval systems and reveal
the benefits of simple image blurring in the adversarial im-
age optimization. Finally, we show that transferring attacks
to new FCNs are much more challenging than their image
classification counterparts.
We focused on concealing the query in a privacy preserv-
ing scenario. In a malicious scenario the adversary might try
to corrupt the search results by targeted mismatch attacks on
indexed images. This is an interesting direction and an open
research problem.
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